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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

February 1986

The New CPSU Program: Charting the Soviet Future

**Summary**

The new CPSU program and statute--approved in draft at the October plenum and scheduled to be adopted in final form at the 27th Congress later this month--provide unique insights into the Gorbachev regime's vision of the future and its strategy for getting there. While offering few specifics in many areas, the program nonetheless establishes general parameters for future programs; it effectively opens up new options to Gorbachev. [redacted]

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This is only the third time since its founding in 1903 that the party has concomitantly rewritten its fundamental guiding documents. The last major revisions occurred in 1961 under Khrushchev.

-- Although often couched in vague terms, the program is the party leadership's most comprehensive statement of its long-term objectives in key areas of domestic and foreign policy.

-- The statute sets out the rules for the party's organization and operation that will define the levers of power available to Gorbachev in running the party. [redacted]

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This paper was prepared by [redacted] the Office of Soviet Analysis, with a contribution from SOVA analyst [redacted]. Comments and questions may be directed to the author [redacted] or to the Chief, Domestic Policy Division, [redacted]

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The new program paints a more sober view of Soviet prospects for the future, both at home and abroad. It discards the 1961 program's predictions that the present generation would see the Soviet Union surpass the capitalist world's standard of living and witness major successes in the global advance of "communism." Instead, it features a more pragmatic view of the domestic and international situation. [redacted]

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Although the program makes clear that new policies are needed to get the country moving again, it does not provide a specific plan of action. Instead, it opens the door to a wide range of options by removing some ideological barriers to reform and calling for a thorough reassessment of the policies inherited from the Brezhnev era. The program's flexible language on both domestic and foreign policy appears to have been crafted to give the regime broad latitude as it hammers out more specific policies in the years ahead. [redacted]

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The new program presents an image of a party leadership that sees strengthening the country's economic base as related to foreign policy considerations. It gives higher priority to domestic issues than the 1961 program, and suggests that Soviet influence abroad is directly dependent upon the country's economic strength and its ability to provide an attractive model for developing countries. At the same time, the program provides no evidence of a retreat from current foreign commitments. It presents the achievement of strategic parity with the United States as a "historic" accomplishment on which there can be no compromise. It suggests that the Gorbachev regime sees negotiations with the United States as useful in preserving and, as in the past, even enhancing this strategic position. [redacted]

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While the new program bears Gorbachev's unmistakable imprint, particularly on economic policy, it also contains indications that he is running into conservative opposition on certain issues. In many parts of the draft different points of view appear to have been intentionally papered over with ambiguous language. The continued influence of conservative elements in the party is evident in the failure of the program and statute to reflect Gorbachev's views on several controversial issues, such as limiting the tenure in office of party officials and expanding public participation in decisionmaking. There are tentative signs that "second" Secretary Yegor Ligachev supported the conservative position on some of these issues. [redacted]

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The 1981 decision to submit a new program to the 27th Congress forced Gorbachev to come up with a draft before he could fully develop his own blueprint for the future or force a resolution of some controversial issues. Because he was confronted with a largely finished document upon assuming power, his redrafting efforts appear to have been focused on softening language which could potentially constrain his freedom of action. Its flexible formulations are likely to spur intense debate over the future direction of Soviet policy, not end it. [REDACTED]

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Discussion of the program and the statute will continue at the party congress, and it is likely that Gorbachev will attempt to take this opportunity to make the documents more to his liking. While changes in the program at the congress should give some indication of the direction the party is heading, many of the controversial issues it raises will be resolved only in the years ahead as the new leadership thrashes out its response to the domestic and international challenges that were left unanswered by the Brezhnev regime. [REDACTED]

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Highlights of the Party Program and Statute  
(Apparently Controversial Issues are Underlined)

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**Overall**

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**1986**

Communism "ultimate" goal of party, to be achieved in distant future.

No specific economic comparisons to the United States.

Features domestic policy, dealing with it before foreign policy.

**1961**

Abundance of Communism "immediate" goal of party to be achieved by 1980.

USSR will surpass the United States in key economic indicators by 1970.

Deals with foreign policy before domestic matters.

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**Domestic Policy**

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**1986**

Sanctions continued role for private agriculture.

Calls for making "fuller" use of commodity-money relations, opening the door to expansion of the market.

No limit on tenure in office of party officials in draft, but campaign under way to restore to statute.

Promises "practically" every family an apartment by 2000.

Calls for "strengthening the state."

**1961**

Calls for elimination of private sector in agriculture.

Calls for eliminating role of commodity-money relations from the economy.

Provision limiting tenure of all party officials (dropped after overthrow of Khrushchev).

Promises every family "comfortable" apartment by 1980.

Calls for "withering away of the state."

Specifically points out the party's leading role in formulating strategic and defense policy.

Refers more generally to party's leadership of military.

### Foreign Policy

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#### **1986**

Recognizes that the capitalist world is still "strong."

Sees three competing centers of capitalism: the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

Allows limited diversity in internal development of bloc countries.

Stresses importance of the experience of all socialist countries.

Emphasizes need for Third World countries to develop with limited Soviet financial support.

#### **1961**

Predicts capitalist world undergoing serious crisis and "ripe" for revolution.

Views West as more monolithic.

Calls for East European countries to have "uniform" political and economic systems.

Stresses importance of Soviet experience.

Stresses "internationalist duty" to aid development in Third World.

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Preface

This memorandum is based primarily on the drafts of the CPSU program and statute and the 1961 documents they replace.

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The New CPSU Program: Charting  
the Soviet Future

The new Soviet party program, approved in draft by the Central Committee's October plenum for presentation to the 27th CPSU Congress that opens 25 February, is the Gorbachev regime's most comprehensive and authoritative statement of overall goals and strategy. The language it enshrines as party doctrine is the result of long and often difficult negotiations and debate directly involving the top party leadership. [redacted]

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The need to revise and update the last party program, approved under Nikita Khrushchev in 1961, provided the impetus for the new draft. Khrushchev's projections of a life of abundance for the present generation of Soviet citizens and the rapid expansion of communism throughout the world were soon recognized by his successors as unrealistic and naive. Although some of its assertions were repudiated at the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, it was allowed to sit on the shelf untouched until 1981, when Brezhnev told the 26th CPSU Congress that it should be revised to reflect current realities. [redacted]

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Officially, the new program is a revision of the Khrushchev program. (See Box) In fact, however, it has been largely rewritten. While it retains the same ultimate goals of Soviet foreign and domestic policy--the worldwide victory of communism and a life of material abundance for Soviet citizens--the program reflects a major rethinking of how they are to be achieved. [redacted]

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Gorbachev's Imprint

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Gorbachev appears to have inherited a nearly completed draft from Chernenko and had it rewritten to reflect his own agenda. In April 1984 Chernenko stated that "substantial work" had been done on the revision, and before his death in March 1985 Embassy sources reported that a draft was nearing completion and would be released shortly. [redacted]

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## CPSU PROGRAMS

Since the founding of the party in 1903, the program has been the most fundamental statement of party policies. It serves both propaganda and policy functions. As the leadership's vision of the future, it is intended to mobilize the rank-and-file and non-party members in support of the party's goals. At the same time, it lays down parameters governing practical policy decisions.

### 1ST PROGRAM 1903

Objective: Overthrow the tsar.

Result: Fulfilled with 1917 October Revolution.

### 2ND PROGRAM 1919

Objective: Creation of a socialist society.

Result: Fulfilled when Stalin declared that the Soviet Union reached stage of socialism in 1936.

### 3RD PROGRAM 1961

Objectives: Surpass United States in per capita production by 1970. Creation of foundations of communism by 1980 with abundance of material and cultural wealth for all.

Workweek of 34-36 hours by 1970.

"Comfortable" apartment for every family by 1980.

Result: Goals still unfulfilled.

### NEW EDITION OF 3RD PROGRAM 1986

Objectives: Prepare way for eventual transition to abundance of communism.

Apartment for "practically every" family by 2000.

Double national income by 2000.

More than double labor productivity by 2000.

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Once Gorbachev became party leader, however, the release of the program was delayed:

- [redacted] 25X1  
Gorbachev mandated changes in a finished draft of the program.
- The draft finally published on 24 October 1985 made evident that major last minute changes were made to reflect the policies outlined by Gorbachev at the April party plenum and the June conference on science and technology.
- [redacted] stated in 25X1  
November that he saw several versions of the program before it was released. [redacted] 25X1

While Gorbachev clearly won some key points as part of his redrafting process, there is evidence that he had to compromise on some issues. In many places the party's new guiding document provides only a dim outline of future direction:

- The program has a number of internal inconsistencies (see sections on the political system and foreign policy) that suggest passages were put in to please specific interest groups.
- While it takes a clear stand on some controversial issues, it sidesteps others that continue to be hotly debated.
- While the program reflects Gorbachev's views on many issues, it is not consistent with positions he has publicly advocated on others.
- Gorbachev and second Secretary Ligachev have publicly alluded to difficulties in the drafting process. [redacted] 25X1

#### A Sober Document

Viewed in the light of the document it replaces, the new program presents a sobering picture of Soviet reality. The 1961 program of Khrushchev made wildly unrealistic projections of a life of abundance for the present generation of Soviet citizens

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### Drafting the New Party Program

The task of revising the program was entrusted to a commission of Central Committee members headed by the General Secretary that drew upon a wide range of expertise. The commission was formed under Brezhnev and composed of the Politburo, Secretariat, and about two dozen other Central Committee members, including:

Viktor Afanasyev	Editor of PRAVDA
Nikolay Baybakov	Head of Gosplan (1965-85)
Petr Fedoseyev	Vice President of the Academy of Sciences
Boris Gostev	First deputy head of CPSU Economics Department (1983-85)
Richard Kosolapov	Editor of KOMMUNIST
Georgiy Markov	Head of the USSR Writers Union
Oleg Rakhmanin	First Deputy Chief of CPSU Bloc Relations Department
Stepan Shalayev	Soviet Trade Union head
Boris Stukalin	Head of the CPSU Propaganda Department (1982-85)
Aleksandr Vlasov	First Secretary of Rostov (1984-86)
Vadim Zagladin	First Deputy Chief of the CPSU International Department

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The program commission set up working groups of specialists to provide input on specific topics. Other specialists submitted written suggestions to the commission. Although only two meetings of the commission were publicly reported, Ligachev stated in a November 1985 KOMMUNIST article that it had met on "numerous" occasions.

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The party leadership did not publicly turn its attention to the revision until after Brezhnev's death in November 1982:

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- The first major discussion of the program was at the June 1983 plenum.
- The first reported meeting of the program commission took place under Chernenko's chairmanship in April 1984.
- The Politburo discussed the program at an August 1984 meeting and decided to revise the party statute as well.

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Gorbachev first became publicly involved with the program on the eve of his elevation to General Secretary, when he discussed many of its provisions in the keynote address to a major party conference on ideology in December 1984. After becoming party leader, he was appointed head of the program commission and delivered the report on the program and statute to the October 1985 plenum, which approved the drafts.

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and the rapid expansion of communist influence throughout the world. Reflecting the economic downturn of the Brezhnev era and slower than expected progress on the international scene, the new program scales back considerably the 1961 goals and makes clear that even these will be achieved only through a reexamination of current policies. While it continues to promise a workers' paradise, it provides no timetable and acknowledges that major mistakes by past leaders have retarded domestic development and reduced Soviet influence abroad. The program makes clear that Gorbachev intends to rectify these errors, but it is evident that the regime remains uncertain how to accomplish this goal. [REDACTED]

### A License for Change

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Although the program provides no clear blueprint for the future, it opens a wider range of options to the leadership by removing some important ideological constraints to fundamental policy changes. (See Box) It encourages innovation, by characterizing "the creative development" of Marxism-Leninism as the party's "most important obligation." Using language similar to that used by Gorbachev at an important December 1984 conference on ideology, it calls for "the rivalry of ideas and avenues of science, and fruitful debates and discussions."

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The most fundamental ideological change in the program is a provision deferring communism to the distant future. While the 1961 program described the achievement of communism--a time of material abundance for all--as an "immediate" task that would be accomplished by 1980, the new program calls it only the "ultimate goal" of party policy. [REDACTED]

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This shift has important practical implications. Marxist-Leninist doctrine calls for elimination under communism of private ownership of production, material differences among the population, and the market. By deferring the timing of communism, the new leadership's ability to explore such unorthodox economic options--actively promoted by some Soviet economists--is enhanced. [REDACTED]

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The new program further prepares the groundwork for innovation by adding language that will make it easier for the leadership to discard ineffective policies. It states that economic and societal problems, so called "contradictions" in Soviet lexicon, must be carefully studied and "promptly" resolved. It characterizes measures to remove such contradictions as a necessary and positive force in domestic development. [REDACTED]

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## IDEOLOGY AND POLICY

Soviet policymakers, even Stalin, have always been careful to have their actions solidly grounded in party theory. Throughout Soviet history fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy have gone hand and hand with corresponding ideological adjustments.

- Stalin's thesis that class struggle does not diminish, but intensifies, under socialism paved the way for the purges which took place under the guise of rooting out class enemies.
  - Khrushchev's thesis that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had been replaced by a "state of the whole people" provided the theoretical justification for ending the repressive measures of the Stalin period.
  - Brezhnev's rejection of Khrushchev's thesis that communism would be achieved soon and substitution of the formula that socialism will last a long time, helped to justify the regime's failure to provide promised consumer goods.
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The language on "contradictions" is a partial victory for Soviet reformers. The 1980-81 Polish crisis sparked a sharp debate in the party, in which advocates of change warned of the danger of similar unrest in the Soviet Union unless the leadership addressed popular concerns and implemented domestic reforms. Specialists at the leading Soviet institute on East Europe took the lead in advancing this view in the Soviet press. Their opponents, led by KOMMUNIST chief editor Richard Kosolapov, argued that Soviet society is too advanced for a Polish-type crisis and that fundamental policy changes are not needed. [redacted]

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The program also suggests a new willingness to reassess past policies by its indirect, but unmistakable criticism of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Without naming them, it criticizes the "personality cult" of Stalin, the "subjectivism and voluntarism" of Khrushchev, and Brezhnev's failure to address growing economic problems.

-- *Although the criticism of Brezhnev is in line with remarks by Andropov and Gorbachev, it is still controversial; a recent letter in IZVESTIYA suggested that this passage be dropped.*

-- *The program further distances the party from the policies of the Brezhnev era by virtually discarding the concept of "developed socialism"--a fundamental ideological tenet of his regime.* [redacted]

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### The Domestic Agenda

The Gorbachev program makes clear that revitalizing the domestic economy is the regime's top priority:

- The sections on foreign and domestic policy are reversed from 1961, with the latter now coming first.
- The domestic policy sections have undergone more fundamental revision than those on foreign policy.<sup>1</sup>
- The foreign policy section opens with the pronouncement that the main goal of the USSR in the international sphere is to "ensure favorable conditions" for domestic development.

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<sup>1</sup> [redacted] told [redacted] that the changing world situation made it less imperative to spell out details of foreign policy. [redacted]

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## PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PROGRAM AND STATUTE

A broad public discussion is now taking place at party meetings and in the Soviet press of the drafts of the party program and statute. A similar procedure was used to discuss the 1961 program and other major Soviet documents, such as the 1977 Constitution and recent five year plans. The leaderships use such discussions to examine various policy options, to gauge public opinion, and allow the population to let off steam. Based on past experience only a few of the thousands of ideas aired during the public discussion will be incorporated into the final versions of the program and statute adopted at the party congress. [redacted]

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The public discussion provides a unique insight into the concerns of the Soviet population as well as policy options now under debate. Proposals with broader policy significance are discussed in the appropriate sections of this memorandum. Other ideas aired in the discussion include:

- A letter by a Soviet general in the army paper called for adding language to the program pledging to supply the armed forces with "all the modern means necessary" for the country's defense.
- A number of letters have suggested changes in the statute that would make party members directly responsible for the actions of candidates they recommend for party membership.
- Various proposals have been made to raise or lower the age of admission for party members and to increase the accountability of party officials.
- A letter in PRAVDA from a member of a small national group proposed abolishing nationality quotas at institutes of higher education and replacing the current system of republic passports with a single system for the entire country.
- A philologist proposed making Russian the official "second" language of all Soviet people. [redacted]

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- The revival of the Leninist formula that socialism will influence the world not through force of arms, but by force of example--an idea that fell into disuse under Brezhnev--reflects an apparent appreciation that the Soviet Union will not be an attractive model as long as capitalist countries do a better job providing for their citizens' wellbeing. [REDACTED]

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### Economic Policy

Gorbachev was successful in getting his way on economic issues--the heart of the new program. These sections of the 1961 program have been completely rewritten and his imprint is clearly evident. Soviet officials told [REDACTED] that this part of the program received the most attention in the drafting process. [REDACTED]

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The only specific economic measures spelled out in the new program were previously set out by Gorbachev in his speeches:

- Decentralizing economic management by increasing the financial autonomy of enterprises.
- Reorganizing the ministries to shift their role toward long-term strategic planning and reducing their staff.
- Accelerating the introduction of advances in science and technology.
- Increasing the role of machine building in revitalizing the economy.
- Increasing reliance on "human factors"--more effective management, improved discipline, and reduced corruption--to boost production. [REDACTED]

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While the program makes a strong rhetorical commitment to the Soviet consumer, it is short on specifics:

- It qualifies the 1961 promise that communism will "fully satisfy" the needs of the people to the more modest pledge to satisfy only "sensible needs."
- It says that "practically every" family will have a house or apartment by 2000. This is a step back from the 1961 program which predicted that every family would have a "comfortable" apartment by 1980. An article in KOMMUNIST proposed that the language in the new draft be changed to guarantee "each family comfortable housing" with more rooms than family members. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The program also unveiled the economic goals that were set out in greater detail in the draft five year plan and guidelines to the year 2000 published in November. These extremely ambitious goals (see box on CPSU programs) were set at Gorbachev's personal urging--he stated in a speech last May that the growth rate of national income should be boosted from 3 percent to a minimum of 4 percent (the program set it at 4.7 percent). As a whole economic goals are formulated in more general terms than in the 1961 program, and specific targets for sectors of the economy have been dropped.

-- *It is surprising that they are included in the program at all in view of the embarrassment of Khrushchev's unfulfilled goals and the criticism Soviet officials have directed at his program for setting specific targets. Their inclusion means that the program may again require revision at the end of the millennium.* [REDACTED]

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The economic sections of the program provide few details on future policy that go beyond the agenda already set forth in public by Gorbachev, suggesting that long-term strategy is still being worked out and may yet be under dispute. The most significant development may be several doctrinal changes that will make it more difficult for conservatives to exploit the program as a barrier to economic reform: [REDACTED]

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Role of the Market. The program leaves the door open to expanding the role of the market should the leadership decide to move in that direction. Indeed, Gorbachev's May 1985 speech in Leningrad, suggests that he favors a policy of allowing greater private initiative in the service sector. The program calls for the economy to make "fuller" use of commodity-money relations and economic levers. In a December KOMMUNIST article, a Soviet economist described this as the most important passage on domestic policy in the program. [REDACTED]

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The term commodity-money relations is vague and has been used by Soviets to denote the use of economic variables such as prices, credit, profits, sales, and profitability to better implement central plans. Although some Soviet officials stated [REDACTED] that the formulation in the program foreshadows an expansion of the "market," it is not clear that they had in mind decentralized price setting and resource allocation based on supply and demand considerations. [REDACTED]

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The role of market forces in the Soviet economy is highly controversial, and any significant movement to rely on them is problematical. The widely divergent views espoused by Soviet officials on the proper role of the market indicate that no policy has yet been worked out. Kosolapov, for example, takes a narrow approach, arguing that the market is not a "natural part" of the Soviet economy and that the expansion of commodity-money

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relations should not be viewed as a "panacea" for all disorders in the economy. Others, such as reform economist P. G. Bunich, have been pressing for an even stronger endorsement of commodity-money relations in the program. [redacted]

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The formulation in the program on commodity-money relations hews closely to Gorbachev's language at the December 1984 ideology conference, where he called for making "better" use of commodity-money relations and increasing reliance on economic levers such as "price, production costs, profit, and credit." Gorbachev's remarks were controversial, and other speakers at the conference argued for a more restrictive definition of the role of commodity-money relations in the economy. [redacted]

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Despite his rhetorical tilt toward the view of reformers, Gorbachev has not challenged the legitimacy of centralized control over price setting and resource allocation. His focus on general themes rather than specific measures that could galvanize opposition may reflect an intent to encourage public debate on controversial issues until he has consolidated his political strength and has the necessary support to implement more far-reaching measures. Since the December conference commodity-money relations have been the subject of continuing debate in the Soviet press. [redacted]

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The Private Sector. The program appears to give a strong guarantee that private agriculture will continue to play an important role in the Soviet economy in the foreseeable future. These changes in the program also undermine some conservative arguments against the private sector. The new program:

- Drops language in the 1961 program calling for the eventual elimination of private agriculture.
- Adds an implicit endorsement of private agriculture, by crediting individual private plots with supplementing food resources.
- Gives a new explicit guarantee of the continuing role for kolkhoz markets, where individuals can sell privately produced foodstuffs at prices determined by supply and demand.
- Leaves the door open to private enterprise by specifying only that the "basic means" of production must be owned socially--a qualification not present in the 1961 program. [redacted]

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Soviet officials [redacted] [redacted] even advocates for the private sector, did not interpret these changes to mean there would be an expansion of private enterprise. They suggested instead that consumer services and

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other small businesses might be operated by cooperatives or small brigades in order to stimulate individual initiative, without expanding private ownership per se.

- In one such experiment in Estonia, described in an August IZVESTIYA article, a group of workers repairs home television sets, working with space and equipment rented from a state enterprise and keeps a portion of the profits. The party program gives a strong endorsement to this type of economic activity, calling it an "effective means" of developing the economy. [redacted]

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### Social Policy

The program charts a relatively low-key, pragmatic course on social policy. It sidesteps key issues in this sphere, suggesting that the Gorbachev regime has not yet worked out its policies:

- The program and statute do not reflect the current campaign against alcoholism. Letters in the press have called for adding provisions punishing party members for drunkenness.
- Despite tentative signs of a thawing of cultural policy, this section of the program is lifted practically verbatim from the 1961 program, retaining the conservative stress on the need for "partymindedness" (partiynost). [redacted]

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At the same time, the program shows greater deference to the persistence of societal groups' differing interests than was evident in the 1961 program, and it is less optimistic about Soviet progress toward a homogeneous society:

- While continuing to press assimilation, it is more flexible on nationality issues and shows greater toleration of cultural differences. It avoids calling for the "merging" of nations--a controversial term that came back into use under Andropov--and defers the "complete unity" of Soviet nations to the "remote historical future."
- Exhibiting a new sensitivity to workers' attitudes that developed as a result of the 1980-81 Polish crisis, it calls for a more active role for trade unions in protecting workers' rights than the 1961 program--which emphasized the unions' role in boosting production.
- Echoing a theme that has been publicly raised by Gorbachev, it places greater emphasis on the role of women than the 1961 program, calling for the party to "more actively nominate women for leadership work."

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- Reflecting the Soviet leadership's concern in recent years to strengthen the family as a pillar of social stability, the new program places greater emphasis on the importance of the nuclear family than the 1961 program--which stressed the communal upbringing of children. [redacted]

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### The Political System

The program provides evidence of persisting differences within the regime over the desirability of opening up the system to broader participation by Soviet citizens. Gorbachev's public remarks at the December ideology conference suggest that he favored stronger language promoting participation in the political process than was contained in the program and party statute. [redacted]

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Reform-minded Soviet academics argue that expanding popular input into decisionmaking is necessary to overcome public apathy and to make economic reforms effective. In a November 1985 meeting with U.S. officials, Anatoliy Butenko, a department head at the leading Soviet institute on East Europe, stressed the link between improving economic performance and expanding public participation. Some of the specific measures he and others have advocated include: giving workers expanded rights in running enterprises, such as electing managers (a measure Kosolapov told a US official was considered by the drafting commission); giving individual enterprises broad autonomy in decisionmaking; allowing local areas to decide issues by referendum; allowing greater freedom in public discussions; making information on sensitive issues more available; and making the party and state election processes more responsive to the electorate. Opponents, like Kosolapov, fear that such changes could get out of hand and undermine political stability. Pointing to the examples of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-81, Kosolapov and other conservatives argue instead for strengthening state control. [redacted]

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This disagreement surfaced during the drafting of the program:

- In October 1984, Kosolapov stated that disagreements in the commission over this issue had brought its work "to a stop."
- There are inconsistencies in the program's treatment of this subject: While the program's theoretical formulations appear to discourage expanding public participation, several recommendations go in the opposite direction.

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- The sharpest differences aired in public by the leadership in 1961 were over this issue, and debate over them has persisted in the Soviet press. [redacted]

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The program makes a nod toward expanding public participation by calling for increasing the role of local soviets (governing councils), broadening public discussion of issues, calling for a more open information policy, and holding national referendums on major issues. It does not, however, contain more far-reaching measures advocated by reformers. Conservatives, moreover, appear to have scored by removing language from the program calling for the "withering away of the state" and replacing it with a call for "strengthening" state institutions.

- In an October 1984 interview, Kosolapov criticized theories of the decline of the state as "utopian," and using language almost identical to that in the new program, stated that although the state will become "apolitical", the need for a "scientific, conscious center of management" would continue to exist.

- Ligachev appeared to associate himself with this view in a November KOMMUNIST article which argued that self-government can only be achieved through the state, thus rejecting in stronger language than the program the idea that the state will give up power to organs of self-government. [redacted]

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Gorbachev may have preferred a stronger endorsement of expanding public participation in the program:

- At the December 1984 ideology conference, he criticized unnamed officials for arguing that practical measures expanding public participation should be put off until the distant future.
- He called for expanding political participation in stronger terms than the new draft program at the October plenum where it was approved.
- Since he became party leader, top government officials have begun to be exposed to public scrutiny by answering questions phoned in by citizens on live television. [redacted]

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Revitalizing the Party. Changes in the party statute--approved at the October plenum along with the program and published three weeks later--appear to be aimed at restoring the credibility of the party leadership. (See Box) Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, one of the Embassy's regular sources, claims that the changes in the statute are of greater political consequence than those in the program. The major proposed changes include:

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### The Party Statute

The statute is the party's basic document outlining its organizational structure and operating procedures. Since the first statute was adopted in 1903, it has been revised 16 times. The rules currently in force were adopted with the party program in 1961, but were amended at the 23rd Congress in 1966 and the 24th Congress in 1971. A decision to revise the statute in conjunction with the program was taken at an August 1984 Politburo meeting, and a commission was appointed to oversee the process. [REDACTED]

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- Party members are given expanded rights of criticism. Under the new provisions they would be able to now criticize any party organization, even those to which they do not belong.
- Party members' immunity before the law is eliminated by a new provision holding them responsible for criminal charges before the party and the judicial system. According to Medvedev, until now party members could not face criminal charges unless they were first expelled from the party.
- It appears to give the central party leadership greater leeway in overseeing the work of party and government organizations.
- It contains stronger language calling for public reporting on internal party business and encourages more open discussion at party meetings. [REDACTED]

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Gorbachev may have run into resistance in an effort to include more radical measures in the statute to facilitate the replacement of ineffective leaders and prevent the formation of local party fiefdoms that occurred under Brezhnev. Medvedev maintains that Gorbachev initially sought provisions to limit the tenure of party officials, but that he backed off due to the strength of the opposition. The draft statute contains only a vague reference to the need for "systematic renewal" of cadres. Tough provisions in the 1961 statute limiting terms of office of all party officials, including the Politburo, were strongly opposed by the party rank-and-file and rescinded at the 23rd Congress following Khrushchev's ouster. [REDACTED]

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Despite this initial setback for Gorbachev, an effort is being mounted to have such provisions added to the rules before they are adopted at the congress. Proposals to strictly limit tenure in office have been the prominently featured in the officially sanctioned "debate" of the draft statute. Two successive issues of the leading party journal KOMMUNIST have carried letters calling for such measures:

- Many of these call for limiting the tenure of party officials to two or three consecutive terms.
- One said that the decision of the 23rd Congress on this subject needs to be reconsidered.
- Another calls for placing age limits on party officials. [REDACTED]

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The discussion of the statute also reveals that there is pressure for changes in party voting procedures that would make it easier for the rank-and-file to hold leaders to account:

- A letter in a major Soviet daily claimed that secret voting is now a sham since party members must cross names off a list in public view in order to vote against a candidate and that as a result "far from everyone" who would like to cast a negative vote does. It calls for new procedures to make voting more secret, such as requiring ballots to be marked in a booth.
- A letter in KOMMUNIST went further, suggesting that multiple candidates run for party posts and that winners be decided by secret ballot. [redacted]

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Ligachev appears to be trying to hold the line against such pressures. He supported eliminating the requirement that officials be elected by secret ballot in the smallest party organizations in his November KOMMUNIST article and suggested that this should also be done in larger party organizations. [redacted]

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### Defense Policy

While the 1961 and the current version of the program both stress the party's leadership of the military, the new program places additional emphasis on the party's role in formulating military policy. A passage has been added that specifically points to the leading role of the party in formulating military doctrine and strategic and defense policy. [redacted]

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This shift may be intended to define civilian influence in areas where military questions have taken on increased political significance. One Central Committee member explained the change to a US official by pointing out that advances in weaponry over the past 25 years have made military doctrine less a question of military maneuvers and expertise and more one of foreign policy and politics. [redacted]

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There is also some tentative evidence that civilians are playing a larger role in shaping national security doctrine:

- Civilian specialists have been playing a more prominent role in articulating Soviet strategic policy for foreign audiences.

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Changes in doctrinal formulations in the draft program also suggest that the emphasis on party direction of defense policy reflects an increased sensitivity in the leadership to the foreign policy implications of military doctrine. Portions of the program essentially emphasize positions that were articulated by Brezhnev beginning in a landmark speech at Tula in January 1977.

- It presents the achievement of "strategic parity" with the United States as an "historic" accomplishment which must be preserved.
- The 1961 program bluntly stated that in a world war imperialism would be "buried." The language in the new program is less hostile, explicitly stating that there will be "neither victors nor vanquished" in a nuclear war.
- It reaffirms the idea--introduced into Soviet military doctrine by Khrushchev--that nuclear war is not inevitable. [REDACTED]

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### Foreign Policy

The new program's scaled-down expectations on the international scene are a further indication of the Gorbachev regime's focus on its domestic agenda. It is more cautious about the advance of communism--and more respectful of the strength of the capitalist world--than the Khrushchev-inspired document it replaces. At the same time, the program contains no hint that the Soviet Union will pull back from its international commitments.

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- In a speech to the Turkmen republic congress First Deputy Head of the CPSU International Department Zagladin directly linked Soviet economic strength to Moscow's success in managing relations with the United States. He claimed that one of the reasons for the failure of detente in the late 1970's was that domestic economic difficulties created an impression of Soviet weakness in the West. [REDACTED]

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The international affairs sections of the program, just as the domestic portions, show the effects of an attempt to balance divergent views. The program opens with an indictment of "imperialism" and an orthodox Leninist interpretation of international developments that should please party conservatives. Later sections, in contrast, spell out current policies in practical terms that are devoid of harsh rhetoric. [ ]

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As a whole, the foreign policy sections of the program are considerably less detailed than in 1961. As in domestic affairs, the Gorbachev regime appears to be keeping its options open. [ ]

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### East-West Relations

The new program reflects the growing role of arms control and trade in the Soviet view of the East-West relationship. While it emphasizes the importance of relations with the United States, it appears to be more optimistic about the prospects for improving ties with Western Europe. Specifically, the language in the new draft is supportive of Gorbachev's efforts to re-engage the West in direct diplomacy, and it bears little trace of the rhetoric of confrontation that Andropov was proposing only three years ago:

- In his speech to the June 1983 party plenum, Andropov said that the program should contain language reflecting the "unprecedented sharpening of the struggle between the two world systems." [ ]

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In contrast, the program avoids harsh rhetoric and focuses instead on resolving specific bilateral issues.

- Arms control is given high priority. Compared to the general formulations contained in most of the program, Soviet arms control negotiating positions are spelled out in detail.
- An expansion of East-West trade is endorsed. At the same time, the draft reflects the impact of U.S. embargoes and international economic instability over the last decade, calling for steps to make the Soviet economy independent from the West in "strategically important" areas and immune from the effects of crises. [ ]

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The program endorses the expanded efforts Moscow has been devoting to using public opinion and political movements in the West as a means of influencing Western governments. It contains a new recognition that "mass democratic movements" are an important "progressive" force in capitalist countries. [ ]

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The relatively sober attitude toward competition with the West is evidently based on a new appreciation of the strength of the capitalist system.

- The program discards the 1961 assertion that the West is nearing collapse and concludes that capitalism is still "strong and dangerous."
- The 1961 program contained a detailed exegesis on the decline of capitalism, describing it as a "rotting and dying" system "ripe" for revolution and calling this the "age of downfall of imperialism." The new program drops much of this language and merely says that the crisis of capitalism is "deepening" and that it is a system which is "historically doomed." [redacted]

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This change appears to be controversial:

- First Deputy head of the CPSU International Department Vadim Zagladin complained in a 1984 article that "some Marxist scientists" incorrectly argue that the crisis of capitalism has entered a more acute stage.
- A KOMMUNIST editorial published after the draft program was released described the crisis of capitalism in more dire terms than the program. [redacted]

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The program leaves no doubt that Soviet diplomacy will increasingly feature differentiated policies toward the Western powers. It underscores the multipolarity of the West by introducing a new formulation calling attention to three main competing centers of capitalism: the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. It also predicts that new centers of economic and political rivalry will develop in the Pacific and in Latin America.

- *The importance of the United States to Soviet foreign policy is nevertheless underscored in the draft. Although it does not recite policy toward any other country specifically, it discusses relations with the United States in detail--calling for "normal, stable relations" and pointing out that "differences of social systems are not a reason for tense relations."*
- *Prospects for relations with West Europe are stated in more positive terms, calling for "peaceful, good-neighborly relations."* [redacted]

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### Soviet Bloc

While the program accepts some diversity in domestic policies, it emphasizes the need for bloc unity on foreign policy matters. The program's flexible approach to internal matters could ease the way for Soviet experimentation with economic reforms tried out in East Europe. [REDACTED]

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The new program gives bloc countries greater leeway in their internal policies than did the Khrushchev program:

- It discards the rigid 1961 line which said that socialist countries must have a "uniform state structure" marked by "social-economic and political uniformity."
- In his June 1983 speech on the program, Andropov said that since the 1961 program the Soviet leadership has recognized that the internal development of socialist countries would not be as "uniform" as once thought, but are more "diverse and complex."
- The new program places less emphasis on the relevance of the Soviet model for other socialist countries and reiterates the legitimacy of various paths to socialism adapted to the "specific conditions of each country."

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The program places greater emphasis on bloc conformity in foreign policy matters. While it stresses the need for coordinated policies in the international arena, it stops short of endorsing the view of hardliners, who rule out any independent actions:

- It calls for "increasingly effective collaboration" on foreign policy matters and a "further deepening" of bloc economic cooperation.
- It says that collaboration in the international arena must take account of both the "situation and interests" of each bloc member and the "common interests" of the community as a whole.
- It softens the position taken in a hardline June PRAVDA article, reportedly written by first deputy head of the CPSU bloc relations department Rakhmanin, that small

countries cannot play an independent role in East-West relations--stating that large and small states "regardless of their potential or geographic location" have a role to play in solving acute problems and curbing the arms race. [redacted]


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During the drafting of the program there was obvious controversy within the Soviet establishment over the acceptable limits of diversity in the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet bloc countries.

-- The June 1985 PRAVDA article by Rakhmanin left practically no room for diversity in internal policy, lashing out strongly at unspecified economic reforms that weaken centralized control or expand the private sector. In uncompromising terms it attacked East European aspirations for greater independence in foreign policy, criticizing "nationalist tendencies" and the position advanced by Hungary and the GDR that "small states" can act as mediators between East and West.

-- After the PRAVDA blast, other articles by well-placed Soviet officials took a more flexible line on diversity within the bloc.

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-- Roy Medvedev claims that Gorbachev and Ligachev did not see eye to eye over this section of the program. [redacted]

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### International Communism

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The program gives Moscow a theoretical framework for dealing with ruling communist parties not part of the Soviet bloc--such as China or Yugoslavia--that the previous program lacked. The 1961 program took a narrow view of the world socialist system that implicitly required recognition of Moscow's supremacy and left no room for ruling parties following an independent path. In contrast, the draft program makes a new distinction between the smaller "socialist community"--Soviet bloc countries belonging to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact--and the broader "socialist system" which includes all communist countries. [redacted]

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The new program also takes a less doctrinaire and more pragmatic approach toward nonruling communist parties. It states that communist parties in each country should "autonomously" determine their own strategic course and adds that "differences" over specific issues should not stand in the way of cooperation. It adopts a far less optimistic view of the prospects for the "international workers movement," noting the "complex" problems that it faces rather than the "favorable" situation described in the 1961 program. In what may be an effort to seek a common denominator to unite disparate parties, the program eschews calling for support of specific Soviet policies, and instead promotes common general goals, such as preventing world war and abolishing "vestiges of colonialism."

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### Third World

The new program is far less sanguine about short-term prospects for Soviet successes in the Third World. While underscoring Moscow's commitment to consolidating its position in the Third World, it accords the Third World less attention than the 1961 program. In contrast, the Khrushchev program--written when the de-colonization process was in full bloom--exuded confidence that the anti-colonial posture of the newly independent states would bolster the USSR in its global competition with Washington.

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The new program also suggests a new sensitivity in the leadership to the limits of Soviet largesse in abetting socialist transformation in the Third World. While expressing "profound sympathy" for Third World nations, the program asserts that they will have to create the material and technical base of a socialist society "mainly through their own effort." Moscow, the program states, will give aid "to the extent of its abilities." In contrast, in his discussion of the program at the 1961 congress, Khrushchev interpreted the program's statement of the party's "internationalist duty" to mean that the Soviet Union would actively assist in the development of major economic projects in the Third World.

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The program's stance on the Third World reflects a reexamination by Soviet officials and specialists of the pace of social change in the Third World and the effectiveness of Soviet assistance in winning reliable allies.

-- Soviet academics began to write in the late 1970's that the trend toward socialism in the Third World was slowing. They argue that Third World countries are unlikely to follow the socialist path unless the Soviet Union can become a more attractive model.

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-- *The language on the Third World reflects a shift in official thinking that was first spelled out by Andropov in his speech on the program to the June 1983 plenum, when he said that the Soviet Union would give economic assistance to developing countries to the "extent" of its ability.* [redacted]

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### Political Implications

Although Gorbachev's imprint on the program and statute is clear, the political compromises and unsettled questions evident in these documents suggest that his regime has not yet resolved some fundamental policy issues. The new leadership does not appear to be prepared to unveil major reforms; Gorbachev's emphasis is on making the existing system work better. The program adds to other indications, however, that the new leadership may be open to more substantial measures over the long term should its ambitious goals require them. Indeed, well-placed Soviet economists have told Embassy officials that far-reaching economic reforms are being drawn up for possible introduction within two or three years. [redacted]

The discussion surrounding the program suggests that the draft papers over two different philosophical approaches within the party to solving the problems facing the Soviet Union. Without challenging the basic assumptions on which the communist system is based, Gorbachev appears to be willing to consider a broad range of political and economic options to strengthen the Soviet state. He appears to be meeting resistance from powerful conservative forces in the party, who oppose major innovations on ideological grounds, apparently fearing that reforms could upset a delicate balance which allows the regime to maintain control. Their spokesmen, such as Kosolapov, argue that any significant relaxation of central control runs the risk of unleashing an uncontrollable process that could undermine the foundations of the system. They point to the recent crisis in Poland and past upheavals in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to make their case. [redacted]

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Given the cautious nature of the Soviet political leadership for the past twenty years, it is likely that healthy skepticism remains among the party rank-and-file about the need for any far-reaching changes. Most party officials now gaining positions of influence spent their formative years in an environment that rewarded conservatism and caution, not bold innovation. As Gorbachev's housecleaning progresses, it is becoming evident that the conservatives' political base extends well beyond the diminishing circle of Brezhnev holdovers.

-- Many of the leading spokesmen for the conservative camp are not members of the old guard but men of the same

generation as Gorbachev. Kosolapov, for example, is only a year younger than Gorbachev and a PRAVDA staffer who authored a recent series of articles staunchly defending the conservative line is even younger.

- The continued political vitality of conservatives was evident in the early February reelection of Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Kazakh party leader Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Shcherbitskiy is the most outspoken conservative spokesman in the Politburo; Kunayev is an old Brezhnev croney. A wide range of Embassy contacts said in recent months that Gorbachev wanted to remove both leaders.
- A steady stream of articles by conservative spokesmen in the Soviet press continues to challenge reforms that appear to be favored by Gorbachev. [redacted]

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Tentative signs have appeared that unofficial "second" Secretary Ligachev may be drawing on these conservative forces within the party to bolster his own position. Although he is clearly a political ally of Gorbachev, the public debates over the program and statute suggest that he took a more cautious position on several issues. Roy Medvedev [redacted]

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[redacted] claimed, moreover, that Ligachev took a more conservative position during the internal party discussions. On several points, Ligachev's view appears to have prevailed. Such posturing in inner party circles could be an effective strategy for building an independent political base, and could set the stage for major battles in the years ahead. [redacted]

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Despite the strength of entrenched conservatism, Gorbachev's demonstrated willingness to move aggressively to build his power and get his program underway suggest that the prospects for bold initiatives should not be underestimated:

- *Key changes in the program appear to undermine conservative arguments against reform and put the party squarely on record as seeking new solutions to chronic problems.*
- *Most major policy shifts in Russian and Soviet history have not reflected the prevailing views of the political elite, but those of a strong and determined leader who takes the initiative.*
- *Gorbachev appears to be the kind of leader who could take such initiative, if he concludes that he can make a good case for more radical measures and he is confident he can overcome resistance.* [redacted]

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### PARTY CONGRESS SCORECARD

Although major policy issues raised by the party program and statute are unlikely to be settled at the party congress that opens on 25 February, there should be new indications of which way the political winds are blowing. Gorbachev will be trying to use the gathering to build his political momentum and can be expected to make every effort to avoid having it resemble the uninspiring, lackluster congresses of the Brezhnev era. Signs that Gorbachev is advancing his agenda at the congress would include:

- A revision of the party statute to limit the tenure of party officials or impose a mandatory retirement age.
- Gorbachev's use of the keynote address to more clearly define some of the points in the program that were left ambiguous, such as cultural policy.
- Changes in the program that would encourage economic reform--such as a stronger endorsement of the expanded use of commodity-money relations or economic levers.
- The unveiling of a specific program for economic reform, possibly in Premier Ryzhkov's speech.
- Changes in the program that would encourage broader public participation in decisionmaking.
- A frank discussion of the roles of Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev. Medvedev claims that Gorbachev plans to push the theme of "debrezhnevization."
- A more open airing of views in the congress discussion--instead of the carefully orchestrated speeches that characterized the congresses of the Brezhnev era.

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